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to the Dalehite view that the imposition of liability on the United States
requires a showing of fault. Such an interpretation necessarily implies that
4
there are areas outside the enumerated exceptions of the Act - in which liability will not be determined by the law of the jurisdiction where the tort
occurred 41 and also that the Government will not be liable "in the same
manner and to the same extent as a private individual under the circumstances." 42 Since this judicial interpretation is contrary to the words of the
Act, Congress should specify that the area of absolute liability is not to be
excluded from its coverage.
PHILIP W. WATSON

SHORT-SWING SPECULATION BY CORPORATE INSIDERS:
WIDENING THE LOOPHOLES IN SECTION 16 (b)
Reliance Electric Co. v. Emerson Electric Co., 404 U.S. 418 (1972)
Respondent Emerson Electric Company, in an unsuccessful attempt to
take over Dodge Manufacturing Company, acquired 13.2 per cent of Dodge's
common stock on June 16, 1967. Subsequently, Dodge shareholders approved
a merger with petitioner Reliance Electric Company, whereafter Emerson decided to dispose of its holdings. On August 28, 1967, Emerson sold enough
shares to reduce its holdings to 9.96 per cent. The remaining shares were
sold in a separate sale on September 11, 1967. In response to a demand by
Reliance, Dodge's successor, to account for profits realized on both sales
under section 16 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,1 Emerson sought
a declaratory judgment as to its liability. The federal district court held
2
Emerson accountable for the entire amount of its profits, finding the two
sales "[e]ffected pursuant to a single pre-determined plan of disposition with
the over-all intent and purpose of avoiding Section 16 (b) liability."3 The
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit acknowledged the intent to avoid
liability, but reversed as to Emerson's liability for the September 11 sale,
and remanded for a determination of the profits realized on the August 28
40. 28 U.S.C. §2680 (1970).

41. Id. §1346(b).
42. Id. §2674.
1. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §16(b), 15 U.S.C. §78p (b) (1970).
2. Emerson Elec. Co. v. Reliance Elec. Co., 306 F. Supp. 588 (E.D. Mo. 1969).
3. Id. at 592.
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sale only. 4 On certiorari5 the United States Supreme Court HELD, under
section 16 (b) Emerson was not liable for profits on the September 11 sale,
notwithstanding the intent to avoid liability by utilizing a two-step method
of disposition. 6
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was enacted by Congress in response
to extensive legislative investigations revealing widespread abuse within the
securities market.7 The Act's purpose was to insure the maintenance of fair
markets, and to prevent excessive speculation and manipulation of securities
transactions.8 Section 16 (b) aims specifically at curbing insider" speculation
by allowing a corporation to recover profits realized from the purchase and
sale of its securities 0 within the statutory short-swing period.1" This provision supplements section 10 (b), a general fraud provision proscribing deceptive practices in market dealings.' 2 Unlike section 10 (b), however, section
16 (b) does not require proof that the insider has taken inequitable advantage
of his position. 1 The statute avoids such difficulties in proof by providing
for an entirely objective standard,' 4 capable of mechanical application. To
incur liability for profits, only two requirements must be met. First, the

4. Emerson Elec. Co. v. Reliance Elec. Co., 434 F.2d 918 (8th Cir. 1970).
5. 401 U.S. 1008 (1971).
6. 404 U.S. 418 (1972) (Douglas, Brennan & White, JJ., dissenting; Powell & Rehnquist,
JJ., did not participate), rehearing denied, 405 U.S. 969, 92 S. Ct. 1162 (1972).
7. S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 7-9 (1934); S. Rep. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. 30-68 (1934).
8. 15 US.C. §78b (1970).
9. The term "insider" refers to a corporate officer or director who owns or deals in
his own corporation's securities, or to one other than an officer or director who owns
more than 10% of the registered stock of a single corporation. 15 U.S.C. §78p (a) (1970).
See note 26 infra.
10. Section 16(a) requires the securities involved to be "any equity security (other
than an exempted security) which is registered pursuant to section 781 of this title ......
15 U.S.C. §78p (a) (1970). Section 781 (a) provides in part: "It shall be unlawful for any
member, broker, or dealer to effect any transaction in any security . . . on a national

15 U.S.C.
securities exchange unless a registration is effective as to such security .......
§781(a) (1970) (emphasis added).
11. Section 16(b) provides: "For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason
of his relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and sale,
or any sale and purchase, of any equity security of such issuer (other than an exempted
security) within any period of less than six months . . . shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part of such beneficial owner,
director, or officer in entering into such transaction .

.

. . This subsection shall not be

construed to cover any transaction where such beneficial owner was not such both at the
time of the purchase and sale, or the sale and purchase, of the security involved, or any
transaction . . . which the Commission by rules and regulations may exempt as not
comprehended within the purpose of this subsection." 15 U.S.C. §7 8p (b) (1970).
12. Section 10(b) prohibits the use or employment of "[a]ny manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors."
15 U.S.C. §78] (b) (1970).
13. Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 235-36 (2d Cir. 1943).
14. Id. at 235.
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transaction must be by an officer, director, or beneficial owner of more than
10 per cent of an issuer's securities. Second, the purchase and sale, or sale
and purchase, must occur within a six-month period. 15
Federal courts have consistently adopted a liberal approach to section
16 (b).' 6 The statute has been viewed as broadly remedial, 17 requiring a
liberal construction to further the congressional purpose of curbing insider
abuse.' 8 Generally, transactions giving rise to speculative abuse have been
viewed as susceptible to liability under this section.' 9 Thus, the phrase "purchase and sale" has been interpreted to include the granting and exercising
of options,'20 the conversion of debentures into common stock, 2 1 and the

exchange of shares in one corporation for those of another. 2 2 Similarly, the
terms "officer" and "director" have been construed to mean anyone performing the functions of an officer or director, though not formally designated
as such.23 Even the literal meaning of the section's terms has yielded to an
interpretation more congruent with the essential policy of the Securities Ex4

change Act.2

The term "beneficial owner" is not defined in the Act; however, reference
is made in the Securities Exchange Commission rules to persons in various
relationships to the owner who stand to benefit from transactions involving
the owner's securities. 25 Thus, the term "beneficial" is apparently used in
the qualitative sense: describing a class of primary and equitable owners
who would benefit, directly or indirectly, from short-swing transactions.
However, mere beneficial ownership does not make one an insider under
the statute. Section 16 (a) requires that one be a beneficial owner "of more
than 10 per centum" of a corporation's securities.2 6 This 10 per cent owner15. 15 U.S.C. §78 p (b) (1970). See note II supra.
16. See, e.g., Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840, 844 (2d Cir. 1959).
17. Ellerin v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 270 F.2d 259, 263 (2d Cir. 1959).
18. Petteys v. Butler, 367 F.2d 528, 535 (8th Cir. 1966).
19. See Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F.2d 693, 697 n.5 (7th Cir. 1970); Ferraiolo v.
Newman, 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958).
20. Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F.2d 693, 697-98 (7th Cir. 1970).
21. Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984, 987 (2d Cir. 1947).
22. Newmark v. RKO General, Inc., 425 F.2d 348, 354 (2d Cir. 1970).
23. Colby v. Klune, 178 F.2d 872, 873 (2d Cir. 1949); 17 C.F.R. §240.3b-2 (1971).
24. Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260, 262 (2d Cir. 1969) (using the deputization theory to interpret the term "director" to include a corporation, one of whose officers
sat on the issuer's board of directors); Blau v. Oppenheim, 250 F. Supp. 881, 884-85 (S.D.N.Y.
1966) (interpreting the provision allowing recovery by the issuer to include the initial
issuer's successor).
25. 17 C.F.R. §240.16a-8 (1971); 31 Fed. Reg. 1005 (1966) (beneficial ownership of
securities held by family members). The term has never been thought to exclude the
owner himself, and the mention of "principal stockholder" in an earlier version of the
Act seems to confirm that approach. H.R. 9323, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 7701 (1934). It may
be that "beneficial owner" was substituted for "principal stockholder" to expand the
scope of liability, reaching those who might be termed equitable owners as well as primary
owners. Thus, a trustee in some circumstances is considered a beneficial owner. 17 C.F.R.
§240.16a-8 (a) (1971). See also 2 L. Loss, SECURITIEs RLGULATION 1100-08 (1961).
26. " (a) Every person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than
10 per centum of any class of any equity security . . . or who is a director or an officer of
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ship gives the stockholder an advantageous relationship to the issuer, whereby he can be treated as an insider.2 7 The first portion of section 16 (b) makes
"such beneficial owner[s]" liable for profits realized on short-swing transactions.2 Therefore, only beneficial owners of more than 10 per cent are
considered insiders potentially liable under section 16 (b).
Repeated use of the term "such beneficial owner" lends some confusion
to the statute. It is unclear what is meant by the section 16 (b) requirement
that "such beneficial owner" be such "both at the time of purchase and
sale." 29 In the instant case the Court determined the use of "such beneficial
owner" within the context of this provision was intended to mean a 10 per
cent owner.30 Thus, the majority reasoned that to incur liability under
section 16 (b), one must both be a 10 per cent owner at the time of purchase
and remain a 10 per cent owner up to the time of sale. 31 However, this
provision is susceptible to a different interpretation. The use of "such beneficial owner" may have been intended to require merely that, once 10 per cent
ownership is obtained, one must remain a primary or equitable owner until the
time of disposition, not that one be a 10 per cent owner at both purchase
32

and sale.

Further analysis of section 16 (b) supports the latter interpretation, since
33
officers and directors are not required to be such at both purchase and sale.
An officer or director who sells securities within six months of purchase but
subsequent to resigning his position, is still liable for profits realized from
his short-swing transaction.3 4 Likewise, one could not avoid liability because
he did not become an officer or director until after purchasing the securities
involved.35 This seems logical, since the insider would not upon resignation
suddenly forfeit all inside information acquired during his term in office,
nor would one be incapable of utilizing his present position in relation to
stocks acquired before he attained an insider status.
the issuer of such security, shall file, at the time of the registration of such security on a
national securities exchange . . . or within ten days after he becomes such beneficial
owner, director, or officer, a statement with the Commission . . . of the amount of all
equity securities of such issuer of which he is the beneficial owner, and within ten days after
the dose of each calendar month thereafter, if there has been a change in such ownership
during such month, shall file with the Commission . . . a statement indicating his
ownership at the dose of the calendar month and such changes in his ownership as have
occurred during such calendar month." 15 U.S.C. §78p (a) (1970).
27. "But the 10% rule is based upon a conclusive statutory presumption that ownership of this quantity of stock suffices to provide access to inside information." 404 U.S.
at 442 (Douglas, J., dissenting). See also Newmark v. RKO General, Inc., 425 F.2d 348,
356 (2d Cir. 1970).
28. 15 U.S.C. §17 p (b) (1970). See note 11 supra.
29. Id.
30. "Such beneficial owner" refers to a beneficial owner of "more than 10 per centum"
mentioned in §16(a). 404 U.S. at 419 n.1.
31. Id. at 423-24.
32. This approach is consistent with that suggested by the SEC in its brief as amicus
curiae. Id.
33. Blau v. Allen, 163 F. Supp. 702, 704 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
34. Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260, 266 (2d Cir. 1969).
35. Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840, 847 (2d Cir. 1959).
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If a corporate director cannot avoid liability by resigning his position,
it is confusing why the courts would demand a different result in regard to
beneficial owners. The beneficial owner, like the director, does not relinquish
all acquired inside information when he sells down to 9.96 per cent. An
interpretation of section 16 (b) requiring 10 per cent ownership at both
purchase and sale seems illogical and contrary to the express legislative purpose of deterring insider speculation."6 The possibility of an interpretation
different from that adopted by the present Court becomes even more significant because, in the Court's words: "[W]here alternative constructions of
the terms of §16 (b) are possible, those terms are to be given the construction that best serves the congressional purpose of curbing short-swing specu37
lation by corporate insiders."
The Court's ruling in the instant case exempted from liability a shortswing transaction in which the stockholder had not maintained a 10 per cent
base holding from the time of purchase up to the time of sale.-3 A similar
requirement was rejected in Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp.39 where
the federal district court determined that a stockholder need not own 10
per cent prior to purchase in order to be a 10 per cent owner at the time
of purchase. 40 Thus, in Stella the literal meaning of the provision requiring
10 per cent ownership at the time of purchase yielded to a liberal interpretation. Otherwise it would be possible for one to purchase a large block of
securities when his previous holdings amounted to less than 10 per cent and
then "sell it out until his ownership was reduced to less than 10% and then
repeat the process, ad infinitum," 41 thus avoiding liability entirely.
In contrast, the instant case holds that Emerson was not a 10 per cent
owner at the time of sale because it was not a 10 per cent owner immediately
prior to sale. By construing the statute literally the majority would allow a
stockholder to realize profits on a purchase and sale without liability on up
to 10 per cent of a corporation's securities, 42 even though within six months
prior to sale he enjoyed a position that is presumed to carry with it accessibility to inside information. 43 The present Court's narrow approach, notwithstanding the obvious opportunity for speculative abuse, may indicate
it would overrule the liberal approach of the Stella decision in favor of
strict construction and mechanical application of section 16 (b).

36. 2 L. Loss, supra note 25, at 1037-38; Comment, Section 16(b): Reevaluation Is
Needed, 25 U. MIAMI L. REv. 144 (1970).
37. 404 U.S. at 424.
38. Id. at 422-25.
39. 104 F. Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). For the purpose of determining when the
statutory short-swing period began, a beneficial owner was considered a 10% owner under
§16(b) when he purchased securities that brought his combined holdings above 10%. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 959.
42. In the present case, Emerson's total profit on 13.2% of Dodge stock amounted to
over $900,000, 404 U.S. at 427 (Douglas J., dissenting). Therefore, Emerson's profit on
10% was approximately $684,000.
43. See note 27 supra.
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It is noteworthy that section 16 (b) applies to any purchase and sale, or
sale and purchase.44 The present decision concerned a typical purchase of
securities subsequently sold at a profit. But the section also applies where
one sells short at a high price, then subsequently purchases at a lower price,
likewise resulting in a profit.4 5 The instant case renders an illogical result in
the latter situation. For example, if a beneficial owner held 500 shares of
XYZ common stock, representing 25 per cent of the corporation's securities,
and sold 50 shares at 20 dollars per share, his holdings would be reduced to
22.5 per cent and his earnings on the sale would amount to 1,000 dollars.
If he re-acquired 50 shares within six months at 10 dollars per share, he
would realize a net profit of 500 dollars. 46 Under the instant case the XYZ
corporation could recover this profit, since the beneficial owner had maintained a base holding of more than 10 per cent. But if the beneficial owner
had sold 450 shares at 20 dollars per share, he would have reduced his
holdings to 2.5 per cent while realizing 9,000 dollars on the sale. If within
six months he re-acquired 450 shares at 10 dollars per share, his net profit
would amount to 4,500 dollars. Under the present decision, however, section
16 (b) would not be applicable to this transaction because the beneficial
owner had reduced his holdings below 10 per cent.
The Court also rejected the district court's conclusion that the two-step
sale should be considered as one. 47 The majority reasoned that "a construction . . . that treats two sales as one upon proof of a pre-existing
intent by the seller is scarcely in harmony with the congressional design of
predicating liability upon an 'objective measure of proof.' ",48 The difficulty
that the statute was designed to alleviate, however, concerns proof of unfair
use of inside information. 49 Therefore it would not be inconsistent to allow
factual inquiry to determine if a sale is one that the statute should affect.
In fact, courts have often engaged in extensive inquiry into whether the particular transaction at issue is one capable of the speculative abuse that
section 16 (b) proscribes. 50 In the present case, a definition of the term "sale!'

44. See note 11 supra.
45. Blau v. Lamb, 242 F. Supp. 151, 159 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). "Finally, (the insider] realized

an additional profit, as a result of statutorily proscribed 'sale-purchase short-swing' by its
,purchase of 100 shares ... ten days after the . .. sale at a higher price per share." Id.
For a definition of a short sale see 17 C.F.R. §240.3b-3 (1971); for rules regulating short
sales see 17 C.F.R. §§240.loa-1, -2 (1971).
46. For a discussion on how to compute profits under §16 (b) see 2 L. Loss, supra

note 25, at 1062-82.
47. Emerson Elec. Co. v. Reliance Elec. Co., 306 F. Supp. 588, 592 (E.D. Mo. 1969).

48. 404 U.S. at 424-25.
49. Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507, 515 (2d Cir. 1966); Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136
F.2d 231, 235-36 (2d Cir. 1943).
50. See text accompanying notes 19-22 supra. See also Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d
342, 344-45 (6th Cir. 1958). "Every transaction which can reasonably be defined as a purchase will be so defined, if the transaction is of a kind which can possibly lend itself to

the speculation encompassed by Section 16 (b)." Id. at 845. The present Court's refusal to
apply this test to Emerson's two-step sale may indicate a rejection of this more liberal

approach.
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to include Emerson's two-step transaction would have sufficed to insure the
desired congressional effect. 5'
Finally, the Court suggested that the SEC's own rules undercut an interpretation that would render Emerson accountable for its transaction. To
enforce the reporting requirements of section 16 (a), 52 the Commission promulgated rule 16a-l, which requires changes in beneficial ownership to be reported by insiders on "Form 4."53 Form 4 originally did not require insiders
to report transactions occurring during a calendar month in which they did
not qualify under the statute as an insider. 54 The form thus relieved exdirectors, ex-officers, and ex-ten per cent owners from the reporting requirement, and exempted them from liability. However, Form 4 was subsequently
invalidated insofar as it exempted transactions by ex-directors and ex-officers. 55
The present Court refused to include ex-ten per cent owners within the
reporting requirement, although there is little reason for treating them
differently.56

The instant decision fits awkwardly into the pattern of judicial decisions
57
construing section 16 (b).
Instead of broadening the scope of the statute
consistent with the express congressional purpose, its effect is to render
section 16 (b) inapplicable to transactions by beneficial owners who employ
a two-step method of disposition. Under the principal case it is entirely permissible for a person to purchase more than 10 per cent of a corporation's
outstanding shares, sell down to 10 per cent and forfeit profits, then dispose
of the remaining 10 per cent without liability within the statutory shortswing period. Such transactions are highly susceptible to the type of speculative
abuse the statute is intended to control, and are extremely attractive due
to the potential for enormous profits. 5s
It is uncertain what motivated the Court to undercut the intent of an
important federal statute and apparently to reject the tendency of lower federal
courts to broaden the scope of section 16 (b). Certainly this was not simply
misdirected adherence to form over substance. Although the securities market
has not yet reached a degree of stability, which no longer necessitates
stringent controls over abusive speculation, perhaps the present Court had

51. "We, therefore, should construe the statute as allowing a rebuttable presumption
that any such series of dispositive transactions will be deemed to be part of a single plan
of disposition, and will be treated as a single 'sale' for the purposes of §16(b). Because
the burden would be on the defendant, not the plaintiff, such a rule would operate with
virtually the same less-than-perfectly automatic efficiency that the statute now does, and it
would comport far more closely with the statute's broad remedial sweep than does the

approach taken by the Court." 404 U.S. at 438-39 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
52. 15 U.S.C. §17 p (a) (1970). See note 26 supra.
53. SEC Rule 16a-1, 17 C.F.R. §240.16a-I (1971).
54. 404 U.S. at 440; Form 4, SEC Release No. 6487 (1961).
55. Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp.. 406 F.2d 260, 268-69 (2d Cir. 1969). See also 34
Fed. Reg. 15,246 (1969) (amending SEC rule 16a-1 to include ex-directors and ex-officers);
17 C.F.R. §240.16a-1 (d, e) (1971).
56. See text accompanying notes 33-36 supra.
57. See text accompanying notes 16-24 supra.
58. See, e.g., note 42 supra.
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more persuasive considerations in mind that prompted such a unique result.
Regardless, the instant decision stands saliently, either as a singular anomaly,
or as a turning point in judicial approach with which future actions under
section 16 (b) must contend.
ToBY S. MONACO
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